The wolfSSL library is a small, fast, portable implementation of TLS/SSL for embedded devices to the cloud. wolfSSL supports up to TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3! Update to wolfSSL 5.9.1 for the latest CVE fixes.
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wolfSSL/wolfssl is a public repo on GitHub by wolfSSL. The wolfSSL library is a small, fast, portable implementation of TLS/SSL for embedded devices to the cloud. wolfSSL supports up to TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3! Update to wolfSSL 5.9.1 for the latest CVE fixes. It declares the GPL-3.0 license on GitHub. It is written mainly in C, has 2,990 stars and last changed on 2026-11-19. Nobody has reviewed it on Take My Repo yet, which says nothing about its quality. Read from GitHub on 2026-11-19.
In the maintainer's words. Shown from GitHub; Take My Repo does not keep a copy.
The wolfSSL embedded SSL library (formerly CyaSSL) is a lightweight SSL/TLS library written in ANSI C and targeted for embedded, RTOS, and resource-constrained environments - primarily because of its small size, speed, and feature set. It is commonly used in standard operating environments as well because of its royalty-free pricing and excellent cross platform support. wolfSSL supports industry standards up to the current TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3, is up to 20 times smaller than OpenSSL, and offers progressive ciphers such as ChaCha20, Curve25519, BLAKE2b/BLAKE2s and Post-Quantum TLS 1.3 groups. User benchmarking and feedback reports dramatically better performance when using wolfSSL over OpenSSL.
wolfSSL is powered by the wolfCrypt cryptography library. Two versions of wolfCrypt have been FIPS 140-2 validated (Certificate #2425 and certificate #3389). FIPS 140-3 validated (Certificate #4718). For additional information, visit the wolfCrypt FIPS FAQ or contact fips@wolfssl.com.
wolfCrypt also includes support for deriving device-unique keys from hardware entropy
(--enable-puf[=small|balanced|strong|strongest], selecting the BCH error-correction
strength). Each raw SRAM readout is health tested before use, so a degenerate readout -
all zero, all ones, a repeating block, or an implausible bit bias - cannot silently
produce a device-independent key. An example exists at
SRAM PUF.
There are many reasons to choose wolfSSL as your embedded, desktop, mobile, or enterprise SSL/TLS solution. Some of the top reasons include size (typical footprint sizes range from 20-100 kB), support for the newest standards (SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3, DTLS 1.0, DTLS 1.2, and DTLS 1.3), current and progressive cipher support (including stream ciphers), multi-platform, royalty free, and an OpenSSL compatibility API to ease porting into existing applications which have previously used the OpenSSL package. For a complete feature list, see Chapter 4 of the wolfSSL manual.
wolfSSL provides a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) compliance via two entry points:
python3 scripts/gen-sbom … for embedded / RTOS / IDE-based builds
(Keil, IAR, STM32CubeIDE, ESP-IDF, Zephyr, plain CMake, custom Makefile)
configured through a hand-edited user_settings.h. No autotools required.make sbom for Linux server / Debian / RPM / Yocto / FIPS-Ready
builds that already use ./configure && make.Both produce SPDX 2.3 + CycloneDX 1.6 JSON intended to satisfy the
NTIA minimum elements. The make sbom path additionally runs
SPDX-spec validation via pyspdxtools and gates the build on it;
the standalone path validates only on demand (see doc/SBOM.md
§ 1.3). Neither path runs an NTIA-minimum-elements checker by
default. See doc/SBOM.md for per-toolchain recipes and the full
flag reference.
wolfSSL supports generating an OmniBOR artifact dependency graph via
make bomsh, providing cryptographic traceability from the installed
library back to every source file that produced it. See doc/SBOM.md
for details.
wolfSSL can generate machine-readable security advisories via
make advisory (requires python3), emitting one CSAF 2.0 document
and one CycloneDX 1.6 VEX document per CVE into advisories/out/
(*.csaf.json and *.cdx.json) from the git-tracked records under
advisories/. See section 21 of INSTALL for details.
wolfSSL as of 3.6.6 no longer enables SSLv3 by default. By default, wolfSSL disables static key cipher suites that use PSK, RSA, or ECDH without ephemeral key exchange. Instead, wolfSSL enables cipher suites that provide perfect forward secrecy (PFS) using ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DH) or Elliptic Curve (ECC) key exchange, both of which are enabled by default.
If you need to support legacy systems that require static key cipher suites, you can enable them using one or more of these defines:
WOLFSSL_STATIC_DHWOLFSSL_STATIC_RSAWOLFSSL_STATIC_PSKImportant: Static key cipher suites reduce security by eliminating perfect forward secrecy. These cipher suites reuse the same long-term private key for all session key exchanges. In contrast, PFS-enabled cipher suites (the wolfSSL default) generate a new ephemeral key for each session, ensuring that compromising a long-term key cannot decrypt past sessions.
When compiling ssl.c, wolfSSL will now issue a compiler error if no cipher
suites are available. You can remove this error by defining
WOLFSSL_ALLOW_NO_SUITES in the event that you desire that, i.e., you're
not using TLS cipher suites.
wolfSSL supports hardware-accelerated AES operations via CryptoCB.
When WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_AES_SETKEY is defined, wolfSSL invokes a CryptoCB
callback during AES key setup. The callback behavior determines the mode:
If callback returns 0 (success) and leaves aes->rounds at 0:
A callback that sets aes->rounds must also build a software key schedule,
since wolfSSL then treats the key as a software key as well. It does so by
calling wc_AesSetKey() on the same object with aes->devId set to a devId
no device is registered under, then restoring it. INVALID_DEVID only works
without WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_FIND, whose find callback can map it back to the
device. This request carries no key direction, so only a
WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_SETKEY callback, which is given one, can build it.
If callback returns CRYPTOCB_UNAVAILABLE:
aes->devCtx to NULL, since wolfSSL does not clear itThis feature enables TLS 1.3 traffic key protection on embedded platforms where symmetric keys must never exist in main RAM.
Enable with: CPPFLAGS="-DWOLF_CRYPTO_CB_AES_SETKEY -DWOLF_CRYPTO_CB_FREE"
wolfSSL takes a different approach to certificate verification than OpenSSL does. The default policy for the client is to verify the server, this means that if you don't load CAs to verify the server you'll get a connect error, no signer error to confirm failure (-188).
If you want to mimic OpenSSL behavior of having SSL_connect succeed even if
verifying the server fails and reducing security you can do this by calling:
wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, WOLFSSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
before calling wolfSSL_new();. Though it's not recommended.
The enum values SHA, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 are no longer available when
wolfSSL is built with --enable-opensslextra (OPENSSL_EXTRA) or with the
macro NO_OLD_SHA_NAMES. These names get mapped to the OpenSSL API for a
single call hash function. Instead the name WC_SHA, WC_SHA256, WC_SHA384 and
WC_SHA512 should be used for the enum name.
Release 5.9.4 has been developed according to wolfSSL's development and QA process (see link below) and successfully passed the quality criteria. https://www.wolfssl.com/about/wolfssl-software-development-process-quality-assurance
NOTE:
WOLFSSL_NO_ASN_STRICT is defined; only the certificate itself is copied into WOLFSSL_X509.struct OcspRequest (exported as OCSP_REQUEST) loses its trailing ssl pointer; consumers that embed the struct must be rebuilt.FIPS_BAD_VALUE_E (override with WC_FIPS_AESGCM_ALLOW_SHORT_NONCES), the CMAC minimum tag is 64 bits, and RSA-PSS salts longer than the hash are refused (FIPS 186-5). --enable-wolfclu no longer enables MD5, Ed25519 or ASN relaxation on FIPS builds.PR stands for Pull Request, and PR references a GitHub pull request number where the code change was added.
[High] CVE-2026-93302 MatchTrustedPeer ignores the public key used, leading to forged CA clones passing verification. Affected builds are any that enable the macro WOLFSSL_TRUST_PEER_CERT and load CA certificates with wolfSSL_CTX_trust_peer_cert() or wolfSSL_trust_peer_cert(). The peer must know the certificates being loaded to either of those APIs to take advantage of the issue. When OPENSSL_COMPATIBLE_DEFAULTS is also defined this widens the affected API to include all CA certificate loading. Both macros are defined when using autoconf builds such as (nginx, haproxy, stunnel, wpas, apache httpd, hitch, bind, rsyslog, ffmpeg, all, distro). When the certificate is listed as a trusted peer certificate the issue previously allowed for a malicious (D)TLS server to bypass authentication once knowing which CA’s the client would accept. This also affects mutual authentication cases where the client knows which CA’s the server has loaded. If building with any of these configurations and using (D)TLS where the loaded CA’s could be known and authentication of the peer is desired, users should either: update to the latest wolfSSL version, apply the fix patch, or use the configure flag --disable-openssl-compatible-defaults and not load CA’s with wolfSSL_CTX_trust_peer_cert() or wolfSSL_trust_peer_cert() to mitigate the issue. The affected certificate verification path with (D)TLS is in wolfSSL versions 5.3.0 to 5.9.2. Found via the Anthropic OSS program. Fixed in commit https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/commit/22bcd51d553eaac1de37bee91fdac80cc47961e1
[High] CVE-2026-89102 In wolfSSL versions 5.7.2 through 5.9.2 there is a client-side implementation flaw in RFC 6961, multiple OCSP response stapling, which can lead to certificate forgery. When a wolfSSL client enables OCSP stapling with the HAVE_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_REQUEST_V2 feature and calls wolfSSL_UseOCSPStaplingV2(ssl, WOLFSSL_CSR2_OCSP_MULTI, options), the client accepts any certificate in the peer's chain as a certificate authority without verifying that the certificate is actually authorized to act as one. This means that an attacker who possesses any certificate that chains to a CA trusted by the client (along with its private key) can forge certificates for arbitrary identities that will be accepted as valid by the client. The end entity certificate of the server is stored in the persistent trust store, affecting subsequent connections that reuse the context even when OCSP multi usage is not employed. Found by internal wolfSSL testing. Fixed in PR 11027
[High] CVE-2026-89136 When using RPK (Raw Public Key), the client side of a TLS 1.2, 1.3 and DTLS 1.2 connection could accept an unsolicited server_cert_type=RawPublicKey which allowed a malicious or misbehaving server to bypass authentication. RPK is off by default and only enabled in --enable-rpk OR --enable-all OR --enable-distro AKA HAVE_RPK builds. This affects versions 5.6.0 to 5.9.2. Thanks to Christos Papakonstantinou (Cantina Security) for the report. Fixed in PR 11009
[Medium] CVE-2026-93304 A (D)TLS 1.2 client can accept a ChangeCipherSpec message before it has sent its ClientKeyExchange. No master secret has been derived at that point, so the client installs read keys derived from a known (deterministic) key and checks the server's Finished against that same key. An out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec can therefore be used by an attacker to complete the handshake in place of the server and send data the client accepts as authentic. The client's own traffic still uses correctly derived keys, so the attacker cannot read it, and the genuine server never completes the handshake. DTLS 1.2 clients are exposed because a datagram read can deliver the out-of-order records on its own. TLS 1.2 clients are exposed when the application supplies received bytes with wolfSSL_inject() or enables read ahead. For certificate suites, the attacker must be in a man-in-the-middle position. For PSK (Pre Shared Key) connections, any fake server can succeed without knowing the PSK. The affected versions of wolfSSL are from 4.7.0 to 5.9.2. Found via the Anthropic OSS program. Fixed in PR 11458
[Medium] CVE-2026-89133 wolfSSL versions 5.9.2 and earlier contain a flaw in the X.509 certificate validation logic where it fails to properly enforce NameConstraints extensions when there is an unconstrained CA tier between a name-constrained intermediate CA and the leaf certificate. wolfSSL incorrectly accepted certificates for hostnames they shouldn't be allowed to cover, due to a chain-walking state-machine bug that resets the validation state when encountering an intermediate without NameConstraints, thereby bypassing cryptographic delegation controls. This defect exists in the default build configuration that makes use of certificates where name constraint extensions are used. Thanks to Jack Lloyd, PathDiff, and Ben Smyth for reporting the issue. Fixed in PR 10687
[Medium] CVE-2026-89134 A certificate with no dNSName SAN but another SAN type present (e.g. registeredID or iPAddress) bypassed the Subject CN dNSName name-constraint check. The CN-as-DNS fallback was gated on cert->subjectCN != NULL && cert->altNames == NULL && !cert->isCA instead of "no dNSName SAN", so an out-of-scope CN was accepted. This incomplete fix from CVE-2026-6731, leading to the name-constraint check issue, was introduced in wolfSSL version 5.9.2. Thanks to Jorge Milla (Pig-Tail) for the report. Fixed in PR 10837
[Medium] CVE-2026-89135 A failed X509_verify_cert call permanently plants an unverified attacker CA in the shared CertManager, bypassing certificate validation in every type-blind sibling consumer (native TLS, OCSP, CRL, direct CM verify). This affects version 5.8.4 through 5.9.2 of wolfSSL with the macros (OPENSSL_EXTRA && !NO_CERTS && !WOLFCRYPT_ONLY) defined or built with --enable-opensslextra and the application is specifically making calls to the X509_verify_cert function. Thanks to Christos Papakonstantinou (Cantina Security) for the report. Fixed in PR 11009
[Low] CVE-2026-15442 In all builds that make use of (D)TLS, including default builds, there is a series of conditional states during the TLS shutdown which could lead to a heap-use-after free. If an application ended up getting a partial wolfSSL_read() which is sometimes caused by a small user buffer passed in, then called wolfSSL_shutdown for a bidirectional close and attempted to wolfSSL_read() again while the peer continues trying to send data during the shutdown it would lead to a state where a potential heap-use-after free happened. This affects versions 4.4.0 through 5.9.2 of wolfSSL. Thanks to the Fuzz0x team for the report. Fixed in PR 10863
[Low] CVE-2026-94417 When an application enables both OCSP and CRL revocation checking on one WOLFSSL_CTX or certificate manager, wolfSSL skips the CRL check for any peer certificate that carries no Authority Information Access OCSP URL, and accepts a certificate the loaded CRL lists as revoked. The soft-fail policy for a missing responder collapses the OCSP result onto success before the code decides whether the CRL fallback is still needed, so "no responder exists" becomes indistinguishable from "the responder answered good". Affected builds define both HAVE_OCSP and HAVE_CRL: --enable-ocsp --enable-crl directly, and implicitly --enable-all, --enable-distro, --enable-curl, --enable-nginx, --enable-haproxy, --enable-stunnel, --enable-lighty, --enable-wpas, --enable-strongswan, --enable-mosquitto, --enable-jni, --enable-openvpn and --enable-krb. An application is affected only if it calls both wolfSSL_CTX_EnableOCSP() (or wolfSSL_EnableOCSP() / wolfSSL_CertManagerEnableOCSP()) and wolfSSL_CTX_EnableCRL() (or the equivalents) with a CRL loaded; an application that uses OCSP stapling alone through wolfSSL_CTX_EnableOCSPStapling() is not affected, because that sets up a separate OCSP instance. The defect sits in ProcessPeerCerts() and is reachable over TLS 1.0 through TLS 1.3 and DTLS, both on a client verifying a server certificate and on a server verifying a client certificate under mutual or post-handshake authentication. When the skipped check falls on a chain certificate rather than the leaf, the unchecked intermediate is promoted into the certificate manager and stays a trusted signer for every later connection on that context, so an affected long-running process needs its WOLFSSL_CTX torn down and not only its library replaced. All wolfSSL versions from 5.9.2 and earlier are affected; on versions 5.9.1 and 5.9.2 the WOLFSSL_OCSP_CHECKALL configuration fails closed with OCSP_NEED_URL, which leaves wolfSSL_CTX_EnableOCSP() without CHECKALL as the exposed configuration on 5.9.2. Found via the Anthropic OSS program. Fixed in PR 11500
[Low] CVE-2026-94418 Under WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, ProcessPeerCertParse() runs the certificate signature check separately from the parse to keep peak memory down, then merges the two results, but it merged the signature result back only when the parse returned 0, so any parse error hid it. ParseCertRelative() reaches its validity-date, name-constraint and critical-extension checks only after ConfirmSignature() has passed, so splitting the signature check out inverts the precedence that makes "override date errors" a sound policy, and ASN_SIG_CONFIRM_E is never surfaced anywhere. The attacker needs no key material from the real PKI and no CA compromise: a self-made certificate carrying the expected subject name, the trusted CA's subject as its issuer, arbitrary bytes where the signature goes, a validity window in the past and the attacker's own key pair is sufficient. Affected builds define WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, which is off by default, is not set implicitly by any platform or preset header, and is not reachable from any CMake option; the autotools routes are --enable-lowresource, --enable-leantls, --enable-tinytls13=cert and --enable-tinytls13=mutualauth, and examples/configs/user_settings_embedded.h reaches it through WC_CFG_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY, which ships as 0, while neither --enable-all nor --enable-distro enables it at all. The application must additionally install a verify callback through wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify() or wolfSSL_set_verify() with WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER that returns 1 for ASN_BEFORE_DATE_E or ASN_AFTER_DATE_E; wolfSSL ships this exact shape as myVerify() in wolfssl/test.h under VERIFY_OVERRIDE_DATE_ERR, which examples/client -D selects. An application with no callback, or whose callback returns preverify for date errors, still fails the handshake, and wolfSSL_CertManagerVerifyBuffer() and wc_CheckCertSignature() report ASN_SIG_CONFIRM_E correctly in the same binary. TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 are affected in both directions, and DTLS reaches the same function; where the forged certificate is a chain certificate the callback's consent causes it to be cached in the WOLFSSL_CTX certificate manager, so an exposed deployment must restart the context or the process rather than merely reconnect. Releases v3.15.5 through v5.9.2 are affected. Found via the Anthropic OSS program. Fixed in PR 11500
[Low] CVE-2026-94419 Without NO_SESSION_CACHE_REF, wolfSSL_get_session() does not return a session object but a ClientSession reference of the form {row, index, hash(sessionID)} into the process-global SessionCache, and ClientSessionToSession() validates it against that hash alone. Because the TLS 1.2 session ID is chosen by the server and sent in clear, AddSessionToCache() matches any other server's session on the same ID and overwrites the client-side entry with that server's master secret, cipher suite and version, while the handle continues to resolve; nothing on the write path compares the peer, the application's server ID or the WOLFSSL_CTX. Resuming through the handle then produces an abbreviated handshake in which no Certificate message is sent, so neither chain verification nor wolfSSL_check_domain_name() runs, and the attacker is accepted as the original server for the whole of that connection. Affected builds are those leaving NO_SESSION_CACHE_REF, NO_SESSION_CACHE, NO_CLIENT_CACHE and TITAN_SESSION_CACHE all undefined, which includes a plain ./configure, --enable-opensslextra and --enable-opensslall; fifteen integration options define NO_SESSION_CACHE_REF and are therefore not affected, among them --enable-all, --enable-distro, --enable-curl, --enable-nginx, --enable-haproxy, --enable-stunnel, --enable-wpas and the rest of the OPENSSL_COMPATIBLE_DEFAULTS family, and --enable-leanpsk, --enable-leantls, --enable-lowresource and --enable-tinytls13 disable the cache outright. The application must use the legacy reference flow, wolfSSL_get_session() or SSL_get_session() followed by wolfSSL_set_session(); wolfSSL_get1_session() returns the session object itself and is not affected, nor are wolfSSL_SetServerID() lookups. Only TLS 1.2 and below and DTLS 1.2 and below are reachable, since TLS 1.3 and ticket resumption with an empty ServerHello session ID both use a client-chosen cache key. The poisoned entry lives in the process-global cache, so it crosses WOLFSSL_CTX boundaries and persists until the entry is evicted or the session times out, 500 seconds by default. Releases v5.3.0 through v5.9.2 are affected; the fix adds a per-write generation counter to the cache and raises WOLFSSL_CACHE_VERSION from 2 to 3, so a cache persisted by an older build is rejected by a fixed one. Found via the Anthropic OSS program. Fixed in PR 11500
make sbom (SPDX 2.3 + CycloneDX 1.6) and make bomsh (OmniBOR build provenance) targets for EU Cyber Resilience Act compliance. by @MarkAtwood (PR 10343)--enable-argon2. Only version 0x13 is implemented. Provides the one-shot wc_Argon2()/wc_Argon2_ex() and a reusable context API (wc_Argon2Init/wc_Argon2SetParams/wc_Argon2DeriveTag/wc_Argon2Free, plus wc_Argon2New/wc_Argon2Delete unless WC_NO_CONSTRUCTORS) that allocates the memory block array once for applications deriving many tags. --enable-argon2-threads fills the segments of a slice in parallel, which does not change the derived tag: the one-shot functions use a thread per lane, and the context API takes a count from wc_Argon2SetThreads(). by @SparkiDev (PR 11165)wc_TspResponse_Verify() now requires a trusted TSA certificate, and the request/TstInfo message imprint setters cross-check the digest length against the hash algorithm. by @SparkiDev (PR 10778, PR 10868) and @yosuke-wolfssl (PR 11152, PR 11153)--enable-tinytls13, a TLS 1.3-only footprint profile (PSK + ECDHE floor with optional minimal X.509), and an in-memory smoke test in examples/tls13/tls13_memio.c. by @aidangarske (PR 10751)--enable-readahead, WOLFSSL_TLS_READ_AHEAD) to cut the number of recv() calls per record. by @Frauschi (PR 10944)wolfSSL_CTX_require_psk() / wolfSSL_require_psk() to require that an external PSK is negotiated for a (D)TLS 1.3 handshake to succeed. by @Frauschi (PR 10745)wolfSSL_CTX_RequireExtendedMasterSecret() / wolfSSL_RequireExtendedMasterSecret() and wolfSSL_CTX_EnableExtendedMasterSecret() / wolfSSL_EnableExtendedMasterSecret() to enforce the Extended Master Secret requirement at runtime; wolfSSL_CTX_DisableExtendedMasterSecret() now also disables server-side EMS, not just the client side. by @kareem-wolfssl (PR 10978)WOLFSSL_VERBOSE_LOGGING tier (WOLFSSL_MSG_VERBOSE(), WOLFSSL_ENTER_VERBOSE(), WOLFSSL_LEAVE_VERBOSE()) and moved the highest-volume traces onto it, cutting DEBUG_WOLFSSL unit test output by about 62%; WOLFSSL_DEBUG_OPENSSL is honored as an alias. by @dgarske (PR 11387)ASN_CRIT_EXT_E. by @anhu (PR 10961)wc_SetDNSEntry() and friends) so applications can build and attach SAN entries to a Cert without internal functions. by @Frauschi (PR 10768)wc_SignCRL_ex2() for signing CRLs with post-quantum and EdDSA keys. by @Frauschi (PR 10943)WOLFSSL_ECIES_STATIC_GCM_NONCE. by @night1rider (PR 10883)WC_RNG_SEED_DEVICE to seed the DRBG from a nominated device such as /dev/hwrng before the default sources. by @dgarske (PR 11216)wc_ConstantCompare() as a public wrapper (guarded by WOLFSSL_NO_CONST_CMP). by @philljj (PR 10867)wc_ecc_key_new_ex(). by @holtrop-wolfssl (PR 11160)WC_PUF_BCH_T) and footprint (WC_PUF_NUM_CODEWORDS); the default build is byte-for-byte compatible with prior releases. by @dgarske (PR 11057)WOLFSSL_BUILD_MSG_NO_ZERO_COPY. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 10899)WOLFSSL_WIDE_BYTE support for CHAR_BIT != 8 targets, validated on the TI C2000 C28x (LAUNCHXL-F28P55X), plus WOLFSSL_MLDSA_VERIFY_SMALLEST_MEM. by @dgarske (PR 10724)WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_SLHDSA, a crypto-callback-only mode for SLH-DSA that saves about 16 KB when the algorithm is offloaded. by @padelsbach (PR 11055)WOLF_CRYPTO_CB returning WC_PENDING_E, driven by wolfSSL_AsyncPoll()) to the HKDF key schedule, transcript HMAC, AES-GCM record encrypt/decrypt, RNG, ECC/X25519 key shares and ECDSA/Ed25519 sign and verify; wc_HKDF_Extract_ex() and wc_HKDF_Expand_ex() now propagate WC_PENDING_E. by @dgarske (PR 11231)WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ASYNC_POLL, a poll-to-complete model for crypto callback devices servicing TLS record ciphers; without it a pending bulk cipher now errors with ASYNC_OP_E instead of corrupting the record. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 10990)WC_ALGO_TYPE_KEYSTORE, a crypto callback algorithm type for lifetime operations on keys held in a hardware key store, with the public API in wolfssl/wolfcrypt/wc_keystore.h behind --enable-cryptocbutils=keystore. Seven operations - plaintext and wrapped import/export, derive, delete and get-info - address keys by an opaque device-defined reference, so a device can create, wrap, derive and destroy keys that never appear in memory. wc_KeyStore_Derive() takes a keySz argument to request the derived key size. by @Frauschi (PR 11336, PR 11425)WC_PK_TYPE_EC_MAKE_PUB, WC_PK_TYPE_EC_CHECK_PUB_KEY), Ed448 sign/verify, CMAC free, and RSA-PSS verify with digest. by @twcook86 (PR 10598), @night1rider (PR 10748, PR 10750, PR 10886) and @rizlik (PR 10663)wc_curve448_init_ex/new/delete and wc_curve448_generic), and --enable-cryptocb=only to turn on every WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_* flag. by @padelsbach (PR 10830, PR 10832, PR 10955), @night1rider (PR 11209) and @JacobBarthelmeh (PR 11112)wc_CryptoCb_IsDeviceRegistered() and rejection of duplicate device registration with ALREADY_E. by @AlexLanzano (PR 10604)ForceZero() no longer issues CPU fences. The wipe is kept alive by a compiler barrier (WC_BARRIER_DATA()) that takes the buffer address, so it is not optimized away for buffers that never leave the inlined code. A caller that needs the zeroed memory to be visible to another core must order it itself with a lock or an atomic release. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 11429)--disable-tlsv12 now defines WOLFSSL_NO_TLS12 and compiles the TLS 1.2 implementation out. Previously it only changed the configure summary and a peer could still negotiate TLS 1.2. by @Frauschi (PR 11324)PERSIST_SESSION_CACHE now saves and restores the entire session cache rather than the first session of each row. The on-disk layout changed, so WOLFSSL_CACHE_VERSION was bumped from v2 to v3; caches saved with v2 (file and memory) are no longer restorable. by @philljj (PR 11070)wc_PufReadSram() now health tests the raw SRAM readout and rejects a degenerate one (all-zero or all-one 128-bit blocks, a block repeating the previous one, or a Hamming weight outside WC_PUF_HW_MIN_PCT..WC_PUF_HW_MAX_PCT, 35% to 65% by default) with PUF_READ_E; wc_PufEnroll() and wc_PufReconstruct() refuse to run on a rejected readout. Qualify a candidate region with the new wc_PufCheckSram() and widen the band if the silicon warrants it. The helper-data format and derived key are unchanged, so helper data enrolled by 5.9.2 stays valid. by @dgarske (PR 11143)wolfSSL_shutdown() on a connection already closed or reset with no close_notify sent now returns WOLFSSL_FATAL_ERROR with SOCKET_PEER_CLOSED_E instead of 0 (WOLFSSL_SHUTDOWN_NOT_DONE), so a loop waiting on 0 terminates. Under OPENSSL_EXTRA this reports as WOLFSSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and adds an entry to the error queue; call wolfSSL_ERR_clear_error() if a non-empty queue after shutdown matters. by @SparkiDev (PR 11022)wolfSSL_X509_STORE_up_ref() only takes a reference on a store allocated with wolfSSL_X509_STORE_new(); a store owned by another object (such as the one wolfSSL_CTX_get_cert_store() returns when none was set) returns 1 without touching the count, matching wolfSSL_X509_STORE_free(). A NULL store still returns 0. by @SparkiDev (PR 11022)wolfSSL_OCSP_parse_url() (OCSP_parse_url) was rewritten to follow OpenSSL. An omitted scheme means http, the scheme is matched case sensitively, IPv6 literals keep their brackets, userinfo up to the first @ of the authority is discarded, the port is reported as written, the query stays with the path and the fragment is dropped. A CR or LF anywhere in the URL and an empty host are still refused. Applications that log, pin or allow-list a responder must use the host this function returns rather than the URL it was given. by @SparkiDev (PR 11022)wolfSSL_set0_verify_cert_store() and wolfSSL_set1_verify_cert_store() now treat a NULL store as a request to clear the store set on the SSL object and revert to the context's store, returning 1. by @SparkiDev (PR 11022)wolfSSL_read_ex() and wolfSSL_write_ex() return BAD_FUNC_ARG for a NULL object in every build instead of 0, which is also the value for "no application data was transferred". Callers treating any non-1 result as failure are unaffected. by @SparkiDev (PR 11022, PR 10926)wolfSSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb() and client_cert_cb are now declared only under WOLFSSL_CERT_SETUP_CB with OPENSSL_EXTRA, the one configuration where the setter could compile. by @SparkiDev (PR 11022)wolfSSL_write_early_data() now fails with WOLFSSL_FATAL_ERROR and TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA at the AEAD key usage limit instead of sending a KeyUpdate before the handshake completes (RFC 9846 Section 5.5), and the budget stops one record short to leave room for EndOfEarlyData. Callers that hit this should abandon early data rather than resume from an offset. Reaching the limit takes roughly 23.7 million early data records. by @SparkiDev (PR 11215)wc_LmsKey_Reload() / wc_XmssKey_Reload() carry no public key. The ExportPubRaw, ExportPub, ExportPub_ex, PublicKeyToDer and Verify functions now return BAD_STATE_E for such a key. by @Frauschi (PR 11426)WOLFSSL_TLS13_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT. by @Frauschi (PR 11306)WOLFSSL_TICKET_KEY_LIFETIME. A larger hint previously left no key available and failed every handshake after the first rotation; the server now continues without issuing a ticket instead. by @mattia-moffa (PR 10822)wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() is now honored, taking precedence over the store's callback. Restrictive callbacks installed on a context, and the pathLen / INVALID_CA overrides, now take effect in OPENSSL_EXTRA builds. by @Frauschi (PR 11094)wolfSSL_CTX_set_cipher_list() and wolfSSL_set_cipher_list() now return WOLFSSL_FAILURE and leave the configured suites unchanged when the list names only TLS 1.3 suites but the context or object cannot negotiate TLS 1.3 (OPENSSL_EXTRA builds). Previously they returned success without applying the list. by @miyazakh (PR 10963)SSL_get_cipher_list() now enumerates the object's configured cipher list, highest priority first, rather than returning only the negotiated cipher at index 0. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 11003)WOLFSSL_ASN_TEMPLATE build; a responder whose certificate does not verify is rejected. by @holtrop-wolfssl (PR 11195)WOLFSSL_SEND_HRR_COOKIE split: WOLFSSL_TLS13_COOKIE now enables only client-side cookie echo; WOLFSSL_SEND_HRR_COOKIE still selects both server and client behavior. by @padelsbach (PR 11101)--enable-all-crypto no longer pulls non-FIPS or legacy algorithms into FIPS builds. The new --enable-all-nonfips-crypto and --enable-all-legacy-crypto bundles hold those algorithms and can be enabled or disabled explicitly alongside --enable-all-crypto for subtractive selection. by @douzzer (PR 11383)WC_RNG gains a per-instance lock and POSIX-conforming fork handlers so one RNG can be shared between threads and across fork(); on by default where the build supports it, opt out with --disable-rng-autolock and --disable-rng-autofork. TLS performance is unchanged since each WOLFSSL owns its RNG. by @kaleb-himes (PR 11210)X509_sign, X509_REQ_sign, X509_set_pubkey, and fixed verifyX509orX509REQ() and the ML-DSA OID handling. by @kojo1 (PR 10962) and @stenslae (PR 10785)--enable-all-quantum-crypto to enable every quantum-resistant asymmetric algorithm. by @douzzer (PR 10920)wc_dilithium_check_key() and added further ML-DSA checks. by @MarkAtwood (PR 10254) and @padelsbach (PR 11056)__aarch64__ guard. by @SparkiDev (PR 10707), @kojiws (PR 10816, PR 10839) and @Frauschi (PR 10958)WOLFSSL_MLDSA_NO_ASN1 builds. by @stenslae (PR 10852)wc_MlDsaKey_SignCtx() through the crypto callback before the private key check so device-resident ML-DSA keys can sign. by @aidangarske (PR 10979)wc_SlhDsaKey_Export* now return MISSING_KEY when no key is present. by @holtrop-wolfssl (PR 11268)ProcessPeerCerts() now applies the serverAuth/clientAuth purpose check to every CA the peer transmits and fails the handshake with EXTKEYUSE_AUTH_E when the CA does not carry the purpose in use. An absent extension and anyExtendedKeyUsage leave all purposes valid (RFC 5280 4.2.1.12), self-signed certificates are exempt, and IGNORE_KEY_EXTENSIONS opts out. Adds WOLFSSL_X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE. by @embhorn (PR 11145)WOLFSSL_TLS13_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT build option. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 11097) and @Frauschi (PR 11379)wolfSSL_CTX_set_scr_check_enabled(). Thanks to Lucca Hirschi and the puffin team at Inria for the report. by @embhorn (PR 10984)WOLFSSL_TLS13_NULL_CIPHER_IN_DEFAULT restores them). Thanks to Ben Smyth for the report. by @kareem-wolfssl (PR 10594)WOLFSSL_X25519_NO_MASK_PEER restores rejection. by @SparkiDev (PR 10713) and @miyazakh (PR 11283)wolfSSL_SetVersion() is now reflected in the advertised versions and downgrade handling. by @padelsbach (PR 11456)wolfSSL_is_init_finished() no longer reports a TLS 1.3 client handshake complete while its Finished message is still buffered after WANT_WRITE. by @gasbytes (PR 11139)WOLFSSL_TLS13_TICKET_CHECK_PSK_MODES). by @julek-wolfssl (PR 11178)WOLFSSL_QT. by @mattia-moffa (PR 11161)wolfSSL_quic_clear(), declare the QUIC record length from the bytes remaining, and fixed a QUIC buffer underflow. by @gasbytes (PR 11196), @yosuke-wolfssl (PR 11045) and @loganaden (PR 10838)wolfSSL_set1_groups_list() with OpenSSL: case-insensitive names and MLKEMxxx aliases. by @Frauschi (PR 10686)wolfSSL_inject() appending data at the wrong offset. by @yosuke-wolfssl (PR 11044)wolfSSL_set_SSL_CTX(), fixing a stale chain and a double free. by @yosuke-wolfssl (PR 11330)wolfSSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(). by @julek-wolfssl (PR 11255)WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY signature failure ahead of the later parse errors, and bind a client session cache reference to the entry contents it was issued for. Thanks to Anthropic for the reports. by @Frauschi (PR 11500)WOLFSSL_TLS13_SHA512 is set; new --enable-tls13-sha512 / CMake WOLFSSL_TLS13_SHA512 options. by @Frauschi (PR 11343)WOLFSSL_DTLS_CID with DTLS 1.2, added receive-side DTLS 1.3 RequestConnectionId/NewConnectionId handling, check a CID record is newest before promoting a pending peer, and return an error on bad CID arguments. by @mattia-moffa (PR 10626) and @rizlik (PR 11364)--enable-asynccrypt-sw end-to-end support with --enable-all, fixing five async defects in the record layer, ECCSI and tests. by @Frauschi (PR 11060)examples/benchmark/dtls_bench, a DTLS throughput benchmark, and optimized the DTLS send path (cached socket-type probe, sequence number as explicit AEAD nonce). by @julek-wolfssl (PR 10551)--enable-ed25519 --enable-certgen). by @ordex (PR 10722)EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key() / EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key() and the deprecated tls_encodedpoint names. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 10607)SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext() for TLS 1.2 and below. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 10625)BIO_get_new_index(), i2d_PUBKEY_bio() and OpenSSL_version(). by @julek-wolfssl (PR 11020)SSL_get_negotiated_group() and SSL_group_to_name(), accept FFDHE group names in SSL_set1_groups_list(), define WOLFSSL_SIGNER_DER_CERT for OPENSSL_ALL so X509_STORE_get0_objects() returns the added certificates (opt out with WOLFSSL_NO_SIGNER_DER_CERT), and run the X509_VERIFY_PARAM host/IP checks in ProcessPeerCerts() before the application verify callback. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 11108)wolfSSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback() (SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback), invoked for every TLS extension received during the handshake. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 11256)SSL_CIPHER_find(), sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete() and SSL_clear_chain_certs(), and fixed SSL_add0_chain_cert() not counting the chain so TLS 1.3 sent a leaf-only certificate. by @Roy-Carter (PR 10518, PR 10517)OBJ_find_sigid_algs, BIO method accessors, and related constants and macros. by @kojo1 (PR 10813)X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() for OpenVPN, with caller-owned CRLs checked during verification. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 10896)d2i_ECPrivateKey() now derives the public key when it is absent from the DER. by @MarkAtwood (PR 10362)X509_verify_cert() no longer mutates the shared store certificate stack, fixing races between concurrent verifications. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 10997)X509_VERIFY_PARAM hostname/IP mismatches to the verify callback so it can override them, and map them to X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH / X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH under OPENSSL_COMPATIBLE_DEFAULTS. by @gasbytes (PR 11156) and @julek-wolfssl (PR 11260)X509_STORE_CTX_init() and a new WOLFSSL object now inherit the full X509_VERIFY_PARAM (hostname, IP and host flags) from the store and CTX. by @gasbytes (PR 11513)X509_STORE_CTX_init() so it does not carry into a later verification. by @gasbytes (PR 11354)X509_NAME_print_ex() flag handling, implemented ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253/ESC_CTRL/ESC_MSB, and write values byte for byte so an embedded NUL no longer leaks heap bytes. by @julek-wolfssl (PR 11395)X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(). by @aidankeefe2022 (PR 11269)wolfSSL_EVP_Cipher() no longer swallows the return code of the single-DES CBC branch, which reported success on a failed operation. by @miyazakh (PR 11411)BN_rand, AddSession, ECDH and X25519. by @yosuke-wolfssl (PR 10824, PR 11048)BN_rand() requests. by @yosuke-wolfssl (PR 11316)SignCert(), EVP_PKEY_keygen() on a populated key and the WOLFSSL_NO_REALLOC populate paths, plus stale EVP_PKEY key metadata. by @Frauschi (PR 11061)WOLFSSL_X509_TINY (minimal-extension X.509 parser with per-feature add-backs) and WOLFSSL_X509_VERIFY_ONLY profiles, cutting roughly 6% to 18% off the certificate parser, with CI coverage. by @aidangarske (PR 10823, PR 10975)WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC builds via the internal WC_ASN_NO_HEAP path. by @aidangarske (PR 10821)WOLFSSL_NO_ASN_STRICT). Thanks to Lucca Hirschi (Inria, France) and the tlspuffin team for the report. by @kareem-wolfssl (PR 10755)WOLFSSL_NO_ASN_STRICT: unknown critical extensions, duplicate extensions and dirName constraints on SANs. by @aidangarske (PR 10922)MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH when loading chains, sending OCSP status and sending the TLS 1.3 Certificate message, with parser input validation. by @ColtonWilley (PR 10209)WOLFSSL_MAX_PATH_LEN. by @kareem-wolfssl (PR 10737)WOLFSSL_CERT_NAME_ALL is defined (the table lacked entries for the extra OIDs) and fixed --disable-rsa builds. by @SparkiDev (PR 11421)MakeAnyCert() now strips leading zeros from caller-supplied serials so the DER INTEGER is minimal and the generated certificate parses, bounds serialSz to CTC_SERIAL_SIZE, and rejects a zero serial (RFC 5280 4.1.2.2). by @embhorn (PR 11433)DecodeGeneralName() so hostname matching still runs on a SAN with an embedded NUL. by @embhorn (PR 10793)wolfIO_DecodeUrl(). by @yosuke-wolfssl (PR 10628), @ejohnstown (PR 10966) and @kareem-wolfssl (PR 10675)GetCRLInfo() under WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK, a CRL load race in BufferLoadCRL(), an uninitialized EncryptedInfo in PEM CRL chain loading, and deep copy revoked entry extensions in DupCRL_Entry(). by @padelsbach (PR 10693, PR 10716), @yosuke-wolfssl (PR 11046) and @gasbytes (PR 11038)GetCertName() in the classic ASN.1 parser. Thanks to Frans van Buul (OpenText Fortify) for the report. by @embhorn (PR 10952)wolfSSL_d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(). Thanks to SecBuddyF, Tencent KeenLab, for the report. by @padelsbach (PR 10861)pem_find_pattern() rejecting PEM without a trailing newline. by @gasbytes (PR 11259)CALLOC_ASNGETDATA result before use in DecodeCertInternal(). by @danielinux (PR 11378)WOLFSSL_OCSP_SCREEN_RESPONDER blocks AIA responder hosts in internal address ranges (SSRF, CWE-918), and WOLFSSL_OCSP_FAIL_IF_NOT_SUPPORTED fails a certificate that advertises no responder; a missing responder now reports the distinct OCSP_NO_URL. by @ejohnstown (PR 10723, PR 10945)WOLFSSL_ASYNC_CERT_YIELD, an opt-in that returns WC_PENDING_E after each certificate in a peer chain is verified during async TLS chain processing. by @dgarske (PR 10738)WOLFSSL_STM32V8), validated on the NUCLEO-V873XJ. by @dgarske (PR 11296)WOLFSSL_MX2_CONF_INCLUDE), the pack codegen assets, and HAL2 console support in the STM32Cube example. by @dgarske (PR 11348, PR 11466)wc_Stm32_Aes_Wrap() blobs unwrap and are interchangeable with ST's HAL (this changes every DHUK-derived key), and wc_ecc_import_wrapped_private() now takes the curve id so an imported wrapped scalar is ready to sign. by @dgarske (PR 11462, PR 11497)NX_NO_PACKET, NX_WINDOW_OVERFLOW and NX_TX_QUEUE_DEPTH now map to WANT_READ/WANT_WRITE so non-blocking operation works, NX_NOT_CONNECTED to a connection close, and the HAVE_NETX socket error aliases were corrected. by @embhorn (PR 11287)CONFIG_POSIX_THREADS, wolfPSA provider support, and stack tracking in the benchmark. by @Frauschi (PR 10983).S assembly files on Zephyr, check OSXSAVE/XGETBV before dispatching AVX code, call Zephyr's clock API instead of remapping the POSIX names, reworked the module's Kconfig, and added Kconfig symbols for a constant-time AES backend (WOLFSSL_AES_CONSTANT_TIME with touch-lines or bitsliced) and WC_ALLOW_ECC_ZERO_HASH so wolfPSA builds without a settings file. by @Frauschi (PR 11401, PR 11431, PR 11522)WC_ECC_FLAG_DERIVE. by @aidangarske (PR 10954) and @dgarske (PR 11201)caamAesCombined declaration. by @danielinux (PR 11282), @night1rider (PR 11262, PR 11261) and @JacobBarthelmeh (PR 11263, PR 11535)wc_AesSetIV() so a new IV takes effect. by @danielinux (PR 11158)KEYUSAGE_E for AES without a key schedule. by @danielinux (PR 10864)wc_ecc_sign_hash_hw() overflow under WOLFSSL_XILINX_CRYPT_VERSAL with WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK. by @miyazakh (PR 11286)atmel_get_random_number() for unknown targets, and added bounds checks to the Freescale DES port. by @holtrop-wolfssl (PR 11247) and @aidankeefe2022 (PR 11360)WOLFSSL_RPIPICO, Apache Mynewt and uITRON4 (XMALLOC_OVERRIDE). by @tjko (PR 10742), @stenslae (PR 10914) and @kojo1 (PR 10925)sys/stat.h only where used and enable HAVE_SERVER_RENEGOTIATION_INFO in the project's user_settings.h. by @padelsbach (PR 11489)--enable-all, AES-NI/AVX1 fixes, unsigned length comparisons above 2 GiB, and a P-256 carry fix. by @SparkiDev (PR 10728, PR 11104, PR 11125)wc_Sha256HashBlock() emits movbe only when CPUID reports MOVBE, and ML-DSA encode_w1 initializes the CPU flags before its AVX2 check. by @sameehj (PR 11340)sp_div_word inline assembly (a latent miscompile found by Fil-C), regenerated the fixed-size SP C sources for capability targets, and reworked the Fil-C CI job. by @Frauschi (PR 11323)sp_x86_64_asm.asm so WOLFSSL_SP_4096 / WOLFSSL_SP_384 builds link. by @embhorn (PR 11254).W encodings for branches whose targets exceed the narrow range, fixing "Branch offset too long" with the IAR compiler. by @mattia-moffa (PR 10939)SP_ALIGN_16. by @SparkiDev (PR 10890, PR 11274, PR 11298, PR 9634)sp_*_from_mp() converts secret inputs in constant time. by @danielinux (PR 10898)wc_Sha256Copy/wc_Sha384Copy, and ChaCha20Poly1305::finalize_verify(). by @MarkAtwood (PR 10425) and @holtrop-wolfssl (PR 10933)WC_RNG pointer in curve25519. by @holtrop-wolfssl (PR 10645, PR 11347)DH::shared_secret buffer size against the prime size. by @holtrop-wolfssl (PR 10924)WOLFSSL_PREFIX once, accept lib or lib64, check for the library file and MSVC/Cygwin names, and rebuild when the variable changes. by @holtrop-wolfssl (PR 10703, PR 11312)pss_check_padding() and check(). by @holtrop-wolfssl (PR 11380, PR 11384, PR 11385)WOLFSSL_HAVE_XMSS, and added LMS/XMSS sub-options. by @SparkiDev (PR 10834) and @Frauschi (PR 10929)--enable-trackmemory with --enable-staticmemory, fixed the -Wno-deprecated-enum-enum-conversion probe under ccache, and --enable-mldsa=verify-only. Thanks to NVIDIA Project Vanessa for the includedir/libdir report. by @kareem-wolfssl (PR 10712), @padelsbach (PR 10977), @julek-wolfssl (PR 10897) and @miyazakh (PR 10923)accept() on glibc, uClibc and Android bionic versions without accept4(). by @kareem-wolfssl (PR 11455)WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC builds with static memory: RSA CA public keys now reach the Signer for chain verification and TLS connections can be established; the wolfCrypt test pool is sized so make check covers the configuration. by @Frauschi (PR 11432)NO_SESSION_CACHE and session tickets, and build wolfevent.c under --enable-usersettings. by @Frauschi (PR 11107) and @danielinux (PR 11002)W64LIT_FORCE_LONG_LONG. by @anhu (PR 10858)--enable-sp=rsa4096 on 32-bit targets, and SOCKET_INVALID detection on Linux. by @philljj (PR 10855), @night1rider (PR 11168) and @sebastian-carpenter (PR 11054)CUSTOM_RAND_GENERATE_BLOCK with HAVE_HASHDRBG, as used by wolfTPM fwTPM on STM32) by guarding the DRBG failure cleanup with the same conditions as its state. by @aidangarske (PR 11504)WC_SVR_USE_NATIVE_REG_BUFS) with a SIMD stress tool, DEBUG_VECTOR_REGISTER_ACCESS_ALWAYS_{ON,OFF}, rng_bank refcount fixes, a 25 ms yield budget, WC_DEBUG_FORCE_KERNEL_SETTINGS, user-supplied SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS() support, and FORTIFY_SOURCE/KMSAN/gcc-17 fixes. by @douzzer (PR 10696, PR 10812, PR 10829, PR 10856, PR 10881, PR 10980, PR 11103, PR 11240, PR 11381, PR 11382)wc_static_assert define, polymorphic atomic load/store macros, and cleanup. by @philljj (PR 10734, PR 10736, PR 10987, PR 11119, PR 11451) and @douzzer (PR 11509)--enable-fips=dev-no-post, FIPS_BAD_VALUE_E/FIPS_UNAPPROVED_E, runtime DH enablement, and centralized FIPS_NO_WRAPPERS handling; shimmed wc_AesGcmEncrypt() under FIPS via wc_compat.h; stabilized fips-ready. by @douzzer (PR 11031, PR 10920) and @kaleb-himes (PR 10934)DH_MIN_SIZE and WC_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE_FOR_SIGN/_FOR_VERIFY. by @lealem47 (PR 10820) and @douzzer (PR 10856)rng_bank with kernel-facing SP 800-90 semantics (seed pools, next-seed generation, RBG-C constructions, lock and debug-statistics options), with whitebox tests and matching Linux kernel module glue. by @douzzer (PR 11435)ProcessPeerCertLeafRevocation() cleared its revocation-lookup flag whenever ssl->status_request or ssl->status_request_v2 was set, but those flags record only that the server's extension was parsed, not that a stapled response arrived or verified, so both the client's own OCSP lookup and its CRL check for the leaf certificate were suppressed in this edge case. Found via the Anthropic OSS program. by @Frauschi (PR 11500)wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData() for bundles that carry certificates, and fixed the size checks in PKCS#12 GetSafeContent(). Found via the Anthropic OSS program. by @kareem-wolfssl (PR 11459)--with-libz with wolfSSL_set_compression() on both peers): DoApplicationData() decompressed a record back over the input buffer sized for the compressed record; the plaintext now goes into a connection-owned buffer with an RFC 5246 6.2.2 length check. by @embhorn (PR 11186)ShrinkOutputBuffer() freeing a static buffer, X509StoreFreeObjList() logic, unoffered certificate types being allowed in the Raw Public Key case, a TEMP_CA leak in wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert(), an implicit length in CheckIPAddr(), and zero heap mp_int structs on allocation before any error path. Thanks to Christos Papakonstantinou (Cantina Security) for the reports. by @kareem-wolfssl (PR 11009, PR 11029)WOLFSSL_SNIFFER_STORE_DATA_CB callback. by @Frauschi (PR 11319)ssl_FreeSniffer() tearing down state shared by every thread; the init entry points now count callers and only the last free releases the shared trace file, mutexes and crypto device. Also fixed a leak of StatsMutex. by @Frauschi (PR 11319)-expectdata option, threaded decoding that drained nothing and skipped keylog setup, and buffer sizing in the example WOLFSSL_SNIFFER_STORE_DATA_CB callback. by @Frauschi (PR 11319)MATCH_SUITE_ERROR failures during handshakes. by @Frauschi (PR 11319)wolfSSL_CTX_set_cert_store(): wolfSSL_X509_STORE_free() now clears the manager's pointer when it releases the store and the context setters re-pair the manager with the store the context owns, preventing a use-after-free in issuer lookups (OPENSSL_ALL with CRL and hash directory support). by @SparkiDev (PR 11022)wolfSSL_set_accept_state() with WOLFSSL_BLIND_PRIVATE_KEY: the static-ECC check decoded the masked key buffer directly, so valid static ECC cipher suites were silently dropped; a masked key is now unmasked into a plain copy for the check. by @SparkiDev (PR 11022)wolfSSL_update_keys() still reports BAD_STATE_E. by @SparkiDev (PR 11215)BUFFER_E now maps to decode_error like BUFFER_ERROR, per RFC 9846 Section 4.3, covering pre_shared_key, psk_key_exchange_modes, early_data, cookie, post_handshake_auth and the certificate type extensions. by @SparkiDev (PR 11215)_ex encrypt: advance the internal nonce counter when an async backend reports WC_PENDING_E, fixing nonce reuse on the async path. by @embhorn (PR 11175)WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ defaults. by @lealem47 (PR 10819)wc_AesCbcEncryptWithKey(). by @rizlik (PR 11004), @MarkAtwood (PR 10251), and @julek-wolfssl (PR 10930)wc_ecc_import_point_der_ex() on bad format bytes, and fixed RsaUnPad_PSS() masking for 1 mod 8 bit moduli. by @MarkAtwood (PR 10592, PR 10256)wc_InitMutex() results. by @cconlon (PR 11111) and @philljj (PR 11141)wc_DhCheckPrivKey_ex(), validated untrusted moduli via random-witness Miller-Rabin, and resolved use-after-frees in wolfSSL_CTX_SetTmpDH* parameter buffers. by @dgarske (PR 10818), @Frauschi (PR 10958), and @padelsbach (PR 11115)wc_ed448_make_public() now stores the derived public key in the key object (matching Ed25519), so a private-only key no longer signs over an all-zero public key after the call. by @Frauschi (PR 11424)ecc_verify_hash() fault checks comparing against uninitialized points, wc_*Init_Id() accepting a NULL id with a positive length across AES, HMAC, ECC, RSA, Falcon, ML-DSA and XMSS, and LMS/XMSS raw public key export returning success before a key exists. by @Frauschi (PR 11426)wc_AsconAEAD128_DecryptUpdate(). by @yosuke-wolfssl (PR 11150) and @danielinux (PR 10973)wc_Tls13_HKDF_Extract() from overwriting caller ikm buffers. by @yosuke-wolfssl (PR 10938)wc_CryptKey() (DES/RC4), wc_BufferKey{Encrypt,Decrypt} (unknown ciphers), and wc_EncryptPKCS8Key_ex() (including padding alignment). by @miyazakh (PR 11193), @holtrop-wolfssl (PR 11049), @embhorn (PR 11327), and @yosuke-wolfssl (PR 10836)wc_hash2mgf() returning WC_MGF1SHA3_224 for MD2/MD4/MD5/MD5-SHA in SHA3-enabled builds instead of WC_MGF1NONE. by @miyazakh (PR 11410)wc_RsaCleanup() key type check so ForceZero runs on the key data in non-FIPS builds. Found via the Anthropic OSS program. by @philljj (PR 11474)wc_srtp_kdf_derive_key(). Found via the Anthropic OSS program. by @philljj (PR 11502)wolfSSL_cmp_peer_cert_to_file() now fails gracefully when called before the handshake. Found via the Anthropic OSS program. by @philljj (PR 11487)wc_Hash* under DEBUG_WOLFSSL, and aligned SHA-512/384 W cache memory free calls. by @danielinux (PR 10927) and @julek-wolfssl (PR 10776)wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData() truncation and noDegenerate bypasses, added safe length additions, fixed streamed SignedData content drops, corrected implicit SKID tagging and DigestInfo mismatches, fixed definite-length [0] decrypts, validated the IV and authTag lengths in EnvelopedData/AuthEnvelopedData decode, resolved context leaks, and fixed NO_PKCS7_STREAM infinite loops. Reported by Jorge Milla (Pig-Tail) (IV and authTag checks). by @miyazakh (PR 11017), @kareem-wolfssl (PR 10882, PR 10833), @aidangarske (PR 10904), @embhorn (PR 10937), and @Frauschi (PR 10928)mp_read_unsigned_bin(), PEM write and Base16/Base64 sizing, fixed EVP_DecodeUpdate() NUL byte overflows, and capped memory BIO write / EVP_Encode* length bounds. by @JacobBarthelmeh (PR 10721), @Frauschi (PR 11093, PR 10803), and @douzzer (PR 10812)X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(), wolfSSL_X509_EXTENSION_set_data(), wolfSSL_ASN1_STRING_set() self-aliasing, and wolfSSL_X509_set_ext() buffer carry-over. (Reported by Kushal Khemka and Mayank Jangid, OpenSec Intelligence). by @JacobBarthelmeh (PR 10706), @Frauschi (PR 11094, PR 10803), and @kareem-wolfssl (PR 11021)wolfSSL_BUF_MEM_grow_ex() calculations under WOLFSSL_NO_REALLOC. (Reported by Pelioro). by @embhorn (PR 10770) and @kareem-wolfssl (PR 10675)wolfSSL_GetSessionAtIndex() and added transferExData to wolfSSL_DupSessionEx(). (Reported by Clouditera Security, Z.ai Security, and NSFOCUS). by @kareem-wolfssl (PR 11041)DecodeToX509(), and freed OCSP chain requests in TLSX_CSR_Free(). by @kareem-wolfssl (PR 10965) and @danielinux (PR 11285)wc_*Copy hash copies, and async offset positioning. (Partially reported by NVIDIA Project Vanessa). by @aidangarske (PR 10788), @kareem-wolfssl (PR 11163), @yosuke-wolfssl (PR 11058, PR 11389, PR 11331), and @Frauschi (PR 10968)wc_DsaVerify error outputs, added RSA RSA_W_ENC guards, corrected NETOS thread stack free ordering, and invalidated LMS keys on write errors. by @aidankeefe2022 (PR 10786) and @Frauschi (PR 11093)wolfSSL_process_quic_post_handshake(). by @Frauschi (PR 10803) and @mattia-moffa (PR 11161)wc_strlcpy/wc_strlcat returns, resolved a 1-byte OOB read in wolfssl_local_MatchBaseName(), and freed MD5/SHA contexts before returning VERIFY_MAC_ERROR in SSL_hmac(). by @danielinux (PR 11047), @holtrop-wolfssl (PR 11237), and @rlm2002 (PR 10708)wolfSSL_read() limits, corrected wolfEntropy size logic, and set invalid wolfEntropy settings to error. by @rlm2002 (PR 10708) and @kareem-wolfssl (PR 10884)WOLFSSL_CHECK_SIG_FAULTS when combined with HAVE_PK_CALLBACKS and --enable-all --enable-pkcallbacks. by @kareem-wolfssl (PR 11000)wc_PufEnroll()/wc_PufReconstructEx() upon hash failure. by @miyazakh (PR 11356)mp_clear(order)), and review findings in ssl_api_*.c. by @anhu (PR 11224), @rlm2002 (PR 10891), and @philljj (PR 10972)OPENSSL_COEXIST gates in openssl/hmac.h, zeroed reserved PSK binder regions, an identicalInnerCondition in ecc_verify_hash(), and FIPS/KCAPI test gating. by @douzzer (PR 11381, PR 11509)wc_MemZero buffer checks under WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO. by @SparkiDev (PR 10988)WC_RNG_BANK_SUPPORT to HAVE_WC_RNG_BANK, and added WC_RNG_WANT_BANKREF_SUPPORT as an explicit flag for the bankref mechanism (always off for FIPS). by @douzzer (PR 11510, PR 11536)CLOCK_MONOTONIC and reports MiB/s. by @night1rider (PR 10946, PR 10947, PR 10887, PR 11249), @rizlik (PR 11090) and @dgarske (PR 11176, PR 11505)For additional vulnerability information visit the vulnerability page at: https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/
See INSTALL file for build instructions. More info can be found on-line at: https://wolfssl.com/wolfSSL/Docs.html
<wolfssl_root>
├── certs [Certificates used in tests and examples]
├── cmake [Cmake build utilities]
├── debian [Debian packaging files]
├── doc [Documentation for wolfSSL (Doxygen)]
├── Docker [Prebuilt Docker environments]
├── examples [wolfSSL examples]
│ ├── asn1 [ASN.1 printing example]
│ ├── async [Asynchronous Cryptography example]
│ ├── benchmark [TLS benchmark example]
│ ├── client [Client example]
│ ├── configs [Example build configurations]
│ ├── echoclient [Echoclient example]
│ ├── echoserver [Echoserver example]
│ ├── pem [Example for convert between PEM and DER]
│ ├── sctp [Servers and clients that demonstrate wolfSSL's DTLS-SCTP support]
│ └── server [Server example]
├── IDE [Contains example projects for various development environments]
├── linuxkm [Linux Kernel Module implementation]
├── m4 [Autotools utilities]
├── mcapi [wolfSSL MPLAB X Project Files]
├── mplabx [wolfSSL MPLAB X Project Files]
├── mqx [wolfSSL Freescale CodeWarrior Project Files]
├── rpm [RPM packaging metadata]
├── RTOS
│ └── nuttx [Port of wolfSSL for NuttX]
├── scripts [Testing scripts]
├── src [wolfSSL source code]
├── sslSniffer [wolfSSL sniffer can be used to passively sniff SSL traffic]
├── support [Contains the pkg-config file]
├── tests [Unit and configuration testing]
├── testsuite [Test application that orchestrates tests]
├── tirtos [Port of wolfSSL for TI RTOS]
├── wolfcrypt [The wolfCrypt component]
│ ├── benchmark [Cryptography benchmarking application]
│ ├── src [wolfCrypt source code]
│ │ └── port [Supported hardware acceleration ports]
│ └── test [Cryptography testing application]
├── wolfssl [Header files]
│ ├── openssl [Compatibility layer headers]
│ └── wolfcrypt [Header files]
├── wrapper [wolfSSL language wrappers]
└── zephyr [Port of wolfSSL for Zephyr RTOS]
wolfSSL/wolfssl is a public repo on GitHub by wolfSSL. The wolfSSL library is a small, fast, portable implementation of TLS/SSL for embedded devices to the cloud. wolfSSL supports up to TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3! Update to wolfSSL 5.9.1 for the latest CVE fixes.
It declares the GPL-3.0 license on GitHub.
Its maker has not tagged a system, so it is unknown here. Its README says what it needs.
Open "Take it" on its page: Take My Repo writes an install plan for your machine and hands it to your AI agent (Claude Code, Codex or Cursor), which asks you before each step. Take My Repo has not tested it on any machine.
Its last change on GitHub was on 2026-11-19. Take My Repo does not judge from that whether it is maintained.
Nobody has reviewed it on Take My Repo yet, which says nothing about its quality.
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